The concept of public key encryption with equality test was introduced at CT-RSA 2010. It has been used in many fields, especially in cloud storage. However, the previous schemes do not provide an effective authorization mechanism. To fill this gap, Ma et al. presented a public key encryption with equality test supporting flexible authorization based on the bilinear pairings. Recently, Lin et al. presented a pairing-free scheme that employs quadratic curve to perform the equality tests, which can achieve a trade-off between computational cost and storage space. In this article, we show that the equality test can be better performed by using a straight line, rather than a quadratic curve. Moreover, we simplify the encryption algorithm, as well as reduce the ciphertext storage space.
Introduction
Searchable encryption (SE) scheme, presented in 2004 by Boneh et al., 1 allows the server to check whether some messages contain specific keyword without retrieving entire messages. Subsequently, scholastic community presented many improved schemes. [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] In 2007, Bellare and ONeill 9 conceptualized deterministic encryption (DE) for public-key encryption schemes, in which the encryption algorithm is executed in a deterministic manner. Later, DE was uplifted by Bellare et al. 10 and Boldyreva and ONeill 11 But, DE could not gain immense appreciations due to its deterministic approach.
With the development of cloud computing and outsourcing, traditional encryption schemes cannot provide the solutions for many applications such as splitting of database. To handle the prescribed issue, Yang et al. 12 proposed the notion of public key encryption with equality test (PKEwET) at CT-RSA 2010. This effective mechanism allows anyone to check whether two ciphertexts contain the same message without decryption. Tang 13 intensified PKEwET with finegrained authorization (FG-PKEwET), which authorizes two users to a semi-trusted proxy, who can perform the equality test on their ciphertexts. Later, an extension of FG-PKEwET was also put forward by Tang. 14 Besides, in the same year, Tang 15 presented a new primitive called all-or-nothing PKEwET (AoN-PKEwET), which authorizes the specific users to perform a plaintext equality test from their ciphertexts. Another perspective in the form of identity-based encryption with equality test (IBEwET) was proposed by Ma 16 that combines the concepts of PKEwET and identity-based encryption.
The privacy of users is an essential context that necessitates to be considered while designing an applied protocol. Therefore, Ma et al. 17 strengthened the concept of PKEwET by introducing flexible authorization, which is termed as PKEwET-FA. In his scheme, the author implemented different authorization policies along with a corresponding trapdoor for each authorization to perform the test algorithm. For instance, as described in Ma et al., 17 suppose Alice is a ciphertext receiver, then four types of authorization with different granularity can be described as follows: Type 1. User-level authorization: All ciphertexts of Alice can be compared with all ciphertexts of any other receiver. Type 2. Ciphertext-level authorization: A specific ciphertext of Alice can be compared with a specific ciphertext of any other receiver. Type 3. User-specific ciphertext-level authorization: A specific ciphertext of Alice can be only compared with a specific ciphertext of a specific receiver, for example, Bob, but could not be compared with any ciphertext of any receiver other than Bob. Type 4. Ciphertext-to-user (or user-to-ciphertext) level authorization: A specific ciphertext of Alice can be compared with all ciphertexts of any other receiver (or vice versa).
Recently, Lin et al. 18 proposed a new PKEwET-FA scheme, in which the equality tests are performed without bilinear pairing. More precisely, the author utilized the message for generating a quadratic curve and then used Shamir's secret sharing scheme to perform the equality test. Although it gets rid of the dependence on bilinear pairings, however, the computational cost of this scheme is high due to the involvement of quadratic curve.
Motivation and contribution
In this article, we improve the scheme presented in Lin et al. 18 by replacing the quadratic curve with the straight line to reduce the computational cost. Moreover, we improve the scheme by simplifying the encryption algorithm while reducing the computation of the modular exponentiation. Comparing with Lin et al., 18 our proposed scheme is more efficient in terms of the equality test as well as with respect to encryption and decryption. Furthermore, the storage space of ciphertexts is also smaller than that of Lin et al. 18 We compare the presented scheme with the previous work and the result shows that our scheme is more efficient and robust.
Organization
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In section ''Preliminaries,'' Shamir's secret sharing scheme and the related security model are discussed. In section ''The proposed scheme,'' we present our scheme and four types of authorization and prove the validity of the proposed scheme. In section ''Security,'' we provide the security proof of presented scheme. In section ''Performances analysis,'' a detailed analysis of the presented scheme and comparisons with other schemes are presented. Finally, concluding remarks are given in section ''Conclusion.''
Preliminaries

Definitions Definition 1. Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem:
Let G be a group of large prime order q, given two 4tuples (g, g a , g b , g ab ) and (g, g a , g b , g c ) 2 G with g 6 ¼ 1, where a, b, c 2 Z q . A DDH algorithm A for a group G is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm satisfying jPr½A(g, G, g a , g b , g ab ) = 00 True 00 À Pr½A(g, G, g a , g b , g c ) = 00 True 00 j .e
We say that the group G satisfies the DDH assumption if there is no DDH algorithm for G.
Definition 2 (Correctness). If a PKEwET À FA scheme is correct, for any sp Setup(k), and (pk j , sk j ) KeyGen(sp, i), the following conditions must be satisfied. 17 1. For any M 2 M, Decrypt(Encrypt(M, pk i ), sk i ) = M always holds.
For any ciphertexts c i
and c j , if Decrypt(c i , sk i ) = Decrypt(c j , sk j ) 6 ¼ ?.
(a) Type 1 Authorization. Given Aut 1 (sk i ) = td 1, i and Aut 1 (sk j ) = td 1, j , it holds that
and Aut 2 (sk j , c j ) = td 2, j, c j , it holds that
Authorization. Given Aut 4 (sk i , c i ) = td 4, i, c i and Aut 4 (sk j ) = td 4, j , it holds that
and c j , if Decrypt(c i , sk i ) 6 ¼ Decrypt(c j , sk j ) (a) Type 1 Authorization. Given Aut 1 (sk i ) = td 1, i and Aut 1 (sk j ) = td 1, j , it holds that
is negligible.
Shamir's secret sharing scheme
Shamir's (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme is based on Lagrange interpolation polynomial. A detailed introduction is described as follows. Given t distinct points (x i , f (x i )), where f (x) is a polynomial of degree less than t, then f (x) is determined as follows
Shamir's scheme is defined for a secret s 2 Z p , by setting a 0 = s, and choosing a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a tÀ1 2 Z q . For all 1 x i q, 1 i n, the trusted party computes f (
) are distributed to n distinct parties. Since the secret is a constant term s = a 0 = f (0), hence, the secret can be recovered from any t shares (x i , f (x i )) as follows
Security models
We recall the security models of PKEwET-FA defined in Ma et al. 17 It consists of six algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Authorization a and Test-a (a = 1, 2, 3, 4) . Suppose that the system has a label i for user u i . The setup algorithm takes the security parameter as input and outputs system parameters sp. The KeyGen algorithm takes as inputs the system parameters, a user i, and outputs the public key and private key of user i. The encryption algorithm takes the given public key, a message M, and outputs ciphertext c i . The decryption algorithm takes the private key sk i , a ciphertext c i , and outputs a message M or ?. The authorization algorithm takes as inputs the private key sk i and other required information and outputs the trapdoor. The test algorithm takes as inputs two ciphertexts, the trapdoors, and outputs 1 for the same message or 0 for otherwise. Because the Type 4 authorization is a combination of Type 1 and Type 2 authorization, we leave out Type 4 authorization queries for simplicity and only allow Type-a (a = 1, 2, 3) authorization queries to the adversary in the security games.
Two types of adversaries for the security of PKEwET-FA are described as follows:
1. Type I adversary. For Type-a (a = 1, 2, 3) authorization, with Type-a trapdoor information, the attacker cannot recover the plaintext from the challenge ciphertext. 2. Type II adversary. For Type-a (a = 1, 2, 3) authorization, without Type-a trapdoor information, the adversary cannot decide c Ã t is the encryption of which message.
First, we define one-way against chosen-ciphertext attack (OW-CCA) security for Type-a (a = 1, 2, 3) authorization against Type I adversary in PKEwET-FA as follows. Game 1. Suppose that A 1 is a Type I adversary and S is the challenger. The target receiver has label t(1 t n). The game between A 1 and S is presented in Figure 1 .
Here
The advantage of A 1 in the aforementioned game is defined as follows
Next, we define the indistinguishable against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) security for Type-a (a = 1, 2, 3) authorization against Type II adversary in PKEwET-FA as follows.
Game 2. Suppose that A 2 is a Type II adversary and S is the challenger. The target receiver has label t(1 t n). The game between A 2 and S is presented in Figure 2 .
The advantage of A 2 in the aforementioned game is defined as follows
Notice. The aim of our scheme is to perform equality test for the messages corresponding to the ciphertexts of different users, which can be used in multi-user settings in a public key encryption.
The proposed scheme
Here, we describe our scheme in detail.
Setup(k):
Let k be a security parameter, M 2 f0, 1g k , the algorithm outputs system parameters sp as follows:
1. Let G be a group of prime order q, g be a random generator of G.
Select hash functions:
KeyGen(sp, i): This algorithm allocates a label for each user and keeps a list of the users with (key, i). With the system parameters sp, it chooses x i , y i 2 Z q randomly and computes
The user's key pair:
Encrypt(M, pk i ): It takes public key pk i and the message M 2 f0, 1g k as input and outputs the ciphertext c i = (c i, 1 , c i, 2 , c i, 3 ) as follows:
then takes x i, 1 , x i, 2 2 f0, 1g l randomly again. 4. Choose a random number r 2 Z Ã q , and let 
Then, it uses M to create f (x) by employing the same process as step (1) and (2) of Encryption process. If both f (x i, 1 ) = y i, 1 and f (x i, 2 ) = y i, 2 hold, the algorithm outputs M; otherwise, it outputs ?.
Suppose u i and u j are two users in the system and c i = (c i, 1 , c i, 2 , c i, 3 ) (resp., c j = (c j, 1 , c j, 2 , c j, 3 )) is a ciphertext of u i (resp., u j ). r i (resp., r j ) denotes a randomness used in the generation of c i (resp. c j ).
Type 1 Authorization
Auth 1 (sk i ): The algorithm outputs a trapdoor td (1, i) 
This algorithm performs as follows
, (x j, 2 , y j, 2 )):
Then, it outputs 1 if f i (x) = f j (x) holds, and 0 otherwise.
Type 2 Authorization
. Test 2 (c i , td 2, i , c j , td 2, j ): This algorithm performs as follows
Type 3 Authorization
The algorithm computes a trapdoor as follows
It is performed as follows
Then, it employs the Lagrange interpolation coefficients to compute D i, 1 = (x i, 2 )=(x i, 2 À x i, 1 ) (mod q),
, D j, 1 = (x j, 2 )= (x j, 2 À x j, 1 ) (mod q), and D j, 2 = (x j, 1 )=(x j, 1 À x j, 2 ) (mod q).
Finally, it tests whether or not V
holds. If it is, it returns 1, and 0 otherwise.
Type 4 Authorization
Auth 4 (sk i , c i ): The algorithm computes a trapdoor td (4 
. Aut 4 (sk j ): The algorithm outputs a trapdoor td (4, j) = Aut 1 (sk j ) = x j Test 4 (c i , td 4, i , c j , td 4, j ): This algorithm performs as follows
Then, it outputs 1 if f i (x) = f j (x) holds, and 0 otherwise. Theorem 1. According to Definition 2, our proposed PKEwET À FA scheme is correct.
Proof. Here, we prove that our scheme satisfies the three conditions, as defined in Definition 2:
1. It is not difficult to check that the first condition is satisfied.
Considering the second condition, for any
sp Setup(k), (pk i ,sk i ) KeyGen(sp,i),c i = (c i, 1 , c i, 2 ,c i, 3 )= Encrypt(M i , pk i ) and c j =(c j, 1 ,c j, 2 ,c j, 3 ) =Encrypt(M j , pk j ), the following equalities hold.
For any message M i (resp: M j ), the straight line f i (x)(resp:, f j (x)) is constructed by passing through two points (x i, 1 , y i, 1 ), (x j, 1 , y j, 1 ) or (x i, 2 , y i, 2 ), (x j, 2 , y j, 2 ).
Type 1 Authorization: With td (1, i) = x i and td (1, j) = x j , we compute
x j, 1 jjx j, 2 jjy j, 1 jjy j, 2 c j, 3 È H 2 (c j, 1 , c j, 1 , c j, 2 ), we compute
Type 3 Authorization: With
with td (3, i, c i , j, c j ) and td (3, j, c j , i, c i ) , we compute
Type 4 Authorization: With td (4, i, c i ) = H 2 (c x i i, 1 , c i, 1 , c i, 2 ) and td (4, j, c j ) = x j , we compute
3. For the third condition, the following scenarios hold:
Security
Scheme security
In this section, we prove the security of our proposed scheme.
Theorem 2. Our proposed scheme is OW-CCA secure based on DDH assumption in the random oracle model for TypeÀa(a = 1, 2, 3) authorization against Type I adversary.
Proof. Suppose A 1 is the Type I adversary breaking the cryptosystem. We build an algorithm B that solves the DDH problem in G by simulating an attack environment to such an adversary. Algorithm B is given with four-tuple (g, g a , g b , g c ) 2 G 4 , its target is to test whether or not g ab = g c holds. During the course of the interaction, B records answers that adversary makes in response to all queries, and additionally maintains a separate watch lists for H 1 .
Let A 1 chooses t as his target at the beginning of the game.
1. Setup.
B creates system parameter sp = (G, g, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , H 5 , H 6 ) by employing a security parameter k as in Setup and provides sp to A 1 , where H 1 is random oracle controlled by B. Then, B generates n public/private key pairs (pk i , sk i )(1 i n) by algorithm KeyGen and provides all pk i = (X i = g x i , Y i = g y i ) to A 1 (if i = t, pk t = (X t = g x t , Y t = g a )) and keeps the sk i = (x i , y i ) (if i = t, then sk t = (x t ) and he doesn't know the sk t corresponding to Y t ) as secret, where x i , y i , x t 2 Z Ã q . 2. Phase 1. A 1 may issue queries to all random oracles for polynomial number of times. The constraint is that t does not appear in the decryption key to retrieve the queries: H 1 query: Responding to A 1 queries, B keeps a list of tuples-H 1 , a tuple of the form (a i , u i ). B does the following: If a i already appears in the H 1 list in the form (a i , u i ), then B responds with H 1 (a i ) = u i Otherwise, B picks u i 2 f0, 1g k randomly, adds a new tuple (a i , u i ) into H 1 -list and responds with H 1 (a i ) = u i
Decryption key queries retrieval (i): B responds A 1 with sk i created in the Setup
If i 6 ¼ t, B runs algorithm Decrypt with a valid c i and sk i as inputs and responds A 1 with the output Else B proceeds as follows:
Using M i to generate P 1 , P 2 as done in the algorithm Encrypt 3. Using the two points:
Authorization queries (i, Á): For a TypeÀa(a = 1, 2, 3) authorization: 1. For a = 1 with given i, B runs Auth 1 (sk i )) by sk i and responds A 1 with td i, 1 = x i (x i = sk i ); 2. For a = 2 with given (i, c i ), B runs Auth 2 (sk i , c i ) by sk i and responds A 1 with td i, 2 = H 2 (c x i i, 1 , c i, 1 , c i, 2 ) (x i = sk i ); 3. For a = 3 with given (i, c i , j, c j ), B runs Auth 3 (sk i , c i , c j ) by sk i , and responds with the following
3. Challenge. Once A 1 decides that Phase 1 is over, B takes a message M t randomly, which will be challenged, encrypts it to generate two points (x t, 1 , y t, 1 ), (x t, 2 , y t, 2 ), and computes the challenge ciphertext
Finally, it provides c Ã t to A 1 as the challenge ciphertext.
4. Phase 2. A 1 issues more queries as in Phase 1.
But there are two conditions as follows: During decryption key queries retrieval, i 6 ¼ t holds; During decryption queries process, (t, c Ã t ) is not allowed. 5. Guess. A 1 outputs a guess M Ã t 2 M. If M Ã t = M t holds, B outputs 1 meaning g ab = g c , and 0 otherwise. c Ã is a valid ciphertext for challenging information, when g ab = g c . Theorem 3. Our proposed scheme is IND-CCA secure based on DDH assumption in the random oracle model for TypeÀa(a = 1, 2, 3) authorization against Type II adversary.
Proof. Suppose that A 2 is the Type II adversary breaking the encryption scheme. We build an algorithm B that solves the DDH problem in G by simulating an attack environment against such an adversary. Algorithm B is given a four-tuple (g, g a , g b , g c ) 2 G 4 , his target is to test whether or not g ab = g c holds.
During the course of the interaction, B records answers it makes in response to all queries, and additionally maintains a separate watch lists for H 1 .
Let A 2 chooses t as his target at the beginning of the game.
B generates system parameter sp = (G, g, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , H 5 , H 6 ) while considering a security parameter k as in the Setup and provides sp to A 2 , where H 1 is random oracles controlled by B. Subsequently, B generates n public/private key pairs (pk i , sk i )(1 i n) by invoking algorithm KeyGen and provides all
and keeps the sk i = (x i , y i ) (if i = t then sk t = (x t ), and it does not know sk t corresponding to Y t ) as secret, where x i , y i , x t 2 Z Ã q . 2. Phase 1. A 2 may issue queries to all random oracles for polynomial number of times. The constraint is that t does not appear in the decryption key to retrieve queries: H i -query: Responding to A 2 queries, B keeps a list of tuples-H 1 , a tuple of the form (a i , u i ). Responding to query a i , B does the following:
Performances analysis
In this section, we discuss the efficiency of our scheme. According to the experimental results in previous studies, [19] [20] [21] a bilinear pairing costs about five times than an exponentiation. Computational complexity in modular exponentiation is higher than in modular inverse. We provide an efficiency comparison with the papers by Ma et al. 17 and Lin et al. 18 in Table 1 , the storage space comparison with Lin et al. 18 in Table 2 , and a brief comparison with others in Table 3 .
In Table 1 , we compare the presented scheme with the scheme in Ma et al. 17 and Lin et al. 18 with respect to the computation complexity of Encrypt (C Enc ), Decrypt (C Dec ) (from the second to the third columns), four types of Authorization (Auth) (from the fourth to the seventh columns) and four types of Test (from the 8th to the 11th columns). In Table 2 , we compare the storage space with Lin et al., 18 in terms of the sizes of pk, sk, C len (from the second to the forth columns). In Table 3 , we present a comparison with the earlier PKEwET schemes while considering the computation complexity in encryption, decryption (from the second to the third columns).
It is quite clear from the tables that our scheme requires smaller ciphertext storage compared to the previous study by Lin et al. 18 Computational cost is less when compared to the previous studies by Ma et al. 17 and Lin et al. 18 in case of Encrypt, Decrypt, four types of Authorizations, and four types of Tests. Thus, our presented scheme is more efficient. From Table 3 , it can be observed that our scheme is more efficient than that of Tang [13] [14] [15] in encryption.
As a whole, our scheme supports much more flexible authorization and is more efficient, compared to previous studies. [12] [13] [14] 17, 18 Thus, we remark that our scheme is more practical for the age of big data.
Conclusion
In this article, we present an improved PKEwET-FA scheme. We prove that our scheme is more flexible and more practical comparing with previous works. For the Encrypt, Decrypt, and Test algorithms, we use a straight line instead of the quadratic curve. Finally, we conclude that the presented scheme achieves lower computational complexity and smaller storage space under the same level of security.
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